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THE ROLE OF SECONDARY IMPACTS UNDER NEPA 
Rosalie Caprio* 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)1 was 
designed to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between 
man and his environment."2 To achieve this goal, the Act imposes 
procedural requirements on all federal agencies to insure that they 
"inform every stage of their decision-making process with conside-
ration of environmental factors, broadly understood."3 The filing 
of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), mandated by sec-
tion 102, "the only one with teeth,"4 serves two functions. First, it 
contributes environmental information to the agency regarding an 
intended action. Second, the EIS provides the public with informa-
tion on the environmental consequences of an action.5 Since the 
filing of an EIS is the only procedure for ensuring the consideration 
of environmental factors, the decision to file or not to file is crucial 
to the implementation of NEPA.6 
An EIS must be filed for "every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment."7 An action 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
I 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). 
2 Id. § 4321. 
3 Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344, 349 (D. Conn. 1972). 
• Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1972). 
5 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974). 
, NEPA, Environmental Impact Statements and the Hanly Litigation: To File or Not to 
File, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 522, 525 (1973) [hereinafter cited as EIS's and Hanly]. 
7 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970). "Major action" is generally defined broadly. See Deutsch, 
The National Environmental Policy Act's First Five Years, 4 ENV. AFF. 3, 23-27 (1975). See 
also Rhode Island Comm. on Energy v. General Services Administraton, 397 F. Supp. 41 
(D.R.I. 1975); Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla. v. Lynn, 382 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Okla. 1974); 
Citizens Organized to Defend Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1972); 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280 (E.D.N.C. 1972). 
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may affect only the physical environment or it may produce an 
immediate physical impact, which in turn induces other changes in 
man's living conditions. A primary impact is the immediate physi-
cal environmental impact directly attributable to the proposed ac-
tion.8 For example, in the construction of a housing project, the 
primary impact would include tree removal, land leveling, or inter-
ference with natural water flow. 
A primary impact can induce a secondary impact.D A secondary 
impact occurs when man's manipulation of the physical environ-
ment in turn affects his living environment. Secondary impacts are 
man's effect on his social, economic, and psychological environ-
ments. The construction of a housing project increases population 
density in the area and also strains sewage and water systems. 
Socio-economic factors such as local unemployment levels, availa-
bility of public services, and crime rates may also be affected. These 
impacts, while not directly involving the physical environment, 
have serious consequences for the living environment. 
Primary impacts are cognizable under NEPA and require the 
filing of an EIS.lO If NEPA applies only to primary impacts, how-
ever, the Act would lack meaning to the millions of city-dwellers. 
Trees and natural land configurations contribute minimally to the 
quality of urban life: "[In the inner city] many of our most severe 
environmental problems interact with social and economic condi-
tions .... Their concept [of environment] embraces not only 
more parks, but better housing; not only cleaner air and water, but 
rat extermination."" 
The severity of secondary impacts on the urban environment is 
demonstrated by the history of the Alaskan pipeline.12 A twenty 
percent increase in population caused by the influx of workers has 
had devastating effects on life in Alaskan communities. Prices have 
skyrocketed. A loaf of bread costs one dollar. Housing is in short 
8 Primary impacts are those that can be attributed directly to the proposed action 
.... If the action involved construction of a facility, such as a sewage treatment works, 
an office building or a laboratory, the primary impacts of the action would include the 
environmental impacts related to construction and operation of the facility and land use 
changes at the facility site. 
40 C.F.R. § 6.304(c)(3) (1976). 
• The Environmental Protection Agency defines secondary impacts as "indirect or induced 
changes." [d. § 6.304(c)(3). 
It See Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Guidelines, id. § 1500.6(a)-(b). 
11 CEQ, SECOND ANN. REp. 189-91 (1971). 
12 See generally Those Post-Pipeline Blues, TIME, Oct. 18, 1976, at 84. 
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supply. Schools, highways, and recreational facilities are over-
crowded. Crime is on the rise. Robberies have increased 100% in 
Anchorage and 200% in Fairbanks since 1973. 13 "Nearly everywhere, 
prostitutes, con men and gamblers have swarmed in to help pipeline 
workers spend their weekly paychecks .... "14 Despite the environ-
mental controversy over the pipeline's effect on the ecological envi-
ronment, this impact on the human environment was unforeseen. 
Failure to predict and plan for such secondary impacts has resulted 
in the destruction of the human environment which existed prior to 
construction of the pipeline. 
This article will first examine NEPA, its legislative history, and 
its administrative enforcement to determine if secondary impacts 
on the human environment are cognizable under the Act. The sec-
ond section will survey the courts' construction of NEPA to deter-
mine which secondary impacts have been included in the scope of 
the Act. 
I. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE INCLUSION OF SECONDARY IMPACTS UNDER 
NEPA 
A. The Wording of the Act 
Since there are no express statutory definitions, impacts on the 
human environment can be defined only by a careful analysis of the 
language used throughout the Act. NEPA has been criticized for 
being "so broad, yet so opaque, that it will take even longer than 
usual to fully comprehend its import."15 Its ambiguous wording 
complicates the task of determining whether secondary impacts are 
cognizable under the Act. 
The stated congressional purpose behind NEPA is, in part: 
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoy-
able harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts 
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and bios-
phere and stimulate the health and welfare of man .... 18 
The stimulation of the welfare of man can occur both through the 
t3 [d. at 86. 
" [d. 
" City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Goose 
Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D. Ore. 1971): "Legislative 
direction couched in such terms can hardly be expected to produce clarity, decisiveness, or 
predictability in administrative decisions." 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). 
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improvement of his physical environment and through the improve-
ment of his socio-economic environment. Although the section does 
not expressly state that NEPA covers secondary impacts, it does not 
exclude them either. 
The declaration of policy section of NEPA specifically encompas-
ses secondary impacts on the environment: 
[R]ecognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrela-
tions of all components of the natural environment, particularly the 
profound influences of population growth, high density urbanization, 
industrial expansion ... and recognizing further the critical import-
ance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall 
welfare and development of man, [Congress] declares that it is the 
continuing policy of the Federal Government. . . to use all practicable 
means and measures. . . in a manner calculated to foster and promote 
the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man 
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, eco-
nomic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans. 17 
Under the declaration of congressional policy, population growth, 
urbanization, and industrial expansion are significant not only be-
cause they affect the natural environment, but also because they 
affect the general welfare. The section impliedly refers to two con-
cepts of environment. Congress first announces a policy directed at 
controlling man's effect on the natural environment, but then pro-
ceeds to express a concern for controlling the effect of the environ-
ment on man's general welfare. It would appear that Congress in-
tended the Act to work both ways-to improve man's impact on the 
physical environment and to improve the impact of environmental 
alteration on man's welfare. The improvement of the impact on 
man's welfare necessitates the consideration of secondary factors. 
Section 102(2) (A) of NEPA requires that each federal agency 
"utilize ... [an] approach which will insure the integrated use of 
the natural and social sciences. . . in planning and decisionmaking 
which may have an impact on man's environment .... "18 By man-
dating the use of social science in environmental planning, this 
section intimates that NEPA was designed to have some effect on 
the socio-economic factors which contribute to man's living environ-
ment. How an Act designed to operate environmentally can accom-
17 [d. § 4331(a). 
18 [d. § 4332(2)(A). 
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modate recognition of social factors is not clear, however. The text 
gives no indication of which secondary factors are cognizable under 
the Act or whether such secondary factors must bear a particular 
relationship to the primary impact in order to trigger the NEPA 
procedures. 
Although the mechanics for the consideration of secondary im-
pacts are vague,t9 NEPA must be read to include secondary, as well 
as primary impacts. Excluding secondary impacts ignores the two-
way relationship between man and environment announced in the 
Act. 
B. Legislative History 
The legislative history of NEPA primarily concerns protection of 
the ecosystem, but it also includes several specific references to 
secondary impacts on the human environment. Senator Jackson, 
the Senate floor manager of NEPA, in presenting the Conference 
Report, identified the socio-economic problems of the cities as one 
aspect of the motivating policy behind NEPA. 
A great deal. . . remains to be done. . . if mankind and human dignity 
are not to be ground down in the years ahead by the expansive and 
impersonal technology modern science has created .... We see in-
creasing evidence of this inadequacy all around us: haphazard urban 
and suburban growth; crowding, congestion, and conditions within our 
central cities which result in civil unrest and detract from man's social 
and psychological well-being .... 20 
By extending the Act to promote "man's social and psychological 
well-being," Senator Jackson was including within the scope of the 
Act impacts on man's living environment in addition to purely 
physical impacts. 
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Re-
port on NEP Nt specifically refers to secondary impacts. In a letter 
I' For an interpretation of NEPA which excludes secondary factors, see Factors to be 
Considered in Making A Threshold Determination that an Environmental Impact Statement 
is Necessary Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419 
(1974) [hereinafter cited as EIS Factors}. "There is nothing which states that NEPA is 
anything more than an environmental law or that anything other than [primary] environ-
mental factors are within its purview." Id. at 431. 
20 115 CONGo REc. 40417 (1969). 
21 S. REp. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2761-66 (1969). The Departmental Reports are 
letters to the Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of 
Representatives from various federal departments in which the heads of these departments 
discuss their views on the bill. 
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concerning the pending legislation, the Acting Secretary of HEW22 
discussed environmental programs as they affect man: "Included in 
these programs are activities concerned with the effect of environ-
mental forces on man in his home, in the community, and in the 
workplace, and the environment as it relates to products by man 
and their effect on him."23 HEW interpreted the Act as affecting not 
only primary but also secondary environmental impacts. 
The legislative history is far from conclusive on the precise inter-
pretation of-impacts on the human environment as used in NEPA. 
But the history does discuss secondary factors, and leaves open the 
possibility that Congress intended secondary factors to be cogniz-
able under NEPA. 
C. Regulations 
Several federal agencies, in defining their role under NEPA, have 
found that secondary impacts must be discussed in an EIS. The 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), established by NEPA to 
"formulate and recommend national policies to promote the im-
provement of the quality of the environment ... ,"24 not only has 
included secondary impacts as cognizable under NEPA, but has 
recognized secondary impacts as sometimes more consequential 
than primary impacts.25 In the Guidelines on the preparation of 
Environmental Impact Statements,28 the Council advises that: 
Secondary, or indirect, as well as primary, or direct, consequences for 
the environment should be included in the analysis [in an EIS]. Many 
major Federal actions ... stimulate or induce secondary effects in the 
form of associated investments and changed patterns of social and eco-
nomic activities. Such secondary effects . . . may often be even more 
substantial than the primary effects of the original action itself.27 
H Robert H. Finch. 
23 S. REp. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2751, 2762 (1969) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970). 
2> 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(3)(ii) (1976). 
28 [d. §§ 1500 et seq. "This directive provides guidelines to Federal departments, agencies, 
and establishments for preparing detailed environmental statements on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment as required by section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act .... " [d. 
§ 1500.1. 
Z7 [d. § 1500.8(a)(3)(iii). The Council also recommends the filing of an EIS for an action 
"the proposed environmental impact of which is likely to be highly controversial .... " [d. 
§ 1500.6(a). This article will not discuss what constitutes a "controversial" action. 
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The Guidelines recommend that secondary factors which have a 
significant impact on community facilities and activities be dis-
cussed in an EIS.28 The Guidelines cite increased population as a 
particular secondary impact which should be examined.2' Redevel-
opment construction, density and congestion, neighborhood charac-
ter and continuity, and impacts on low income populations are also 
named as areas of environmental concern.30 
The CEQ Guidelines are advisory only and do not have the force 
of law;31 nevertheless, as the agency established to define compli-
ance with NEPA,32 the Council's regulations should be given great 
weight in interpreting the Act.33 The CEQ's determination is sub-
stantial authority for requiring the discussion of secondary impacts 
in an EIS. 
Other agencies, following the lead of the CEQ, have promulgated 
regulations which specify that secondary impacts should be in-
cluded in an EIS.34 For example, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) Regulations dictate that whether an action requires 
an EIS is to be determined by its primary and secondary effects. 36 
If the action involves construction of a facility, the secondary impacts 
would include the environmental impacts related to: 
(i) induced changes in the pattern ofland use, population density, and 
related effects on air and water quality or other natural resources. 
(ii) increased growth at a faster rate than planned for or above the 
total level planned for by the existing community.31 
In addition to such secondary factors as population density and 
growth, the EPA requires an EIS to include a discussion of how 
socio-economic activities and land use changes caused by the pro-
28 [d. 
21 "For example, the effects of the proposed action on population and growth may be among 
the more significant secondary effects." [d. 
30 See "Areas of Environmental Impact and Federal Agencies and Federal State Agencies 
with Jurisdiction by Law or Special Expertise to Comment Thereon," 40 C.F.R. § 15oo.6(a), 
app. n. 
31 Hiram Clarke Civic Center v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421,424 (5th Cir. 1973). 
3' 42 U.S.C. § 4322(3) (1970). See also CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1976). 
33 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
:u See The Department of Defense Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 214.7 (1976); Department of 
Housing and Urban Development Regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 58.27 et seq. (1976); The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 6.200 et seq. (1976). The Treasury 
Department Regulations, 36 Fed. Reg. § 14221 (1971), incorporate the primary/secondary 
distinctions as defined in the CEQ Guidelines. 
30 40 C.F.R. § 6.2oo(a)(2) (1976). 
3' [d. § 6.304(c)(3)(iHii). 
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posed action will conflict with the local land use plans and policiesY 
Considering the EPA's special expertise in environmental matters, 
its emphasis on secondary impacts strongly supports the argument 
that secondary impacts are cognizable under NEPA. 
The Department of Defense Regulations also discuss secondary 
impacts. The Defense Regulations find that, "[a]lthough the sec-
ondary socio-economic impacts are generally insufficient by them-
selves to require an EIS, these factors should be included in the 
statement, in the event an EIS is required. "38 Other agencies, such 
as the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, which have developed regulations under 
the authority of NEPA, recognize secondary impacts but do not 
specifically define their role in the preparation of the EIS.39 
The regulations promulgated by federal agencies recognize the 
role of secondary impacts under NEPA. Agencies, bound by their 
own regulations,40 must discuss secondary impacts in the prepara-
tion of an EIS. 
II. COURTS' RECOGNITION OF SECONDARY IMPACTS UNDER NEPA 
Since no one agency is empowered to enforce NEPA, the courts 
are charged with ensuring compliance with the Act's procedural 
mandatesY In order to determine compliance with NEPA, the 
courts must evaluate the agency's d(i!termination of environmental 
impact. In various situations, the courts have required the discus-
sion of secondary impacts,42 reasoning that the Act would provide 
37 [d. § 6.304(c)(4). 
'38 32 C.F.R. § 214.7(b)(2) (1976). Population density and neighborhood character are recog-
nized as secondary impacts. [d. § 214.7(c)(3)(iHii). 
3' See Department of Housing and Urban Development Regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 58.27 et 
seq. (1976); Treasury Department Regulations, 36 Fed. Reg. § 14221 (1971). 
•• "A government agency is pound by its own regulations . . . . Under section 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, [1970] a reviewing court cannot only deter-
mine all relevant questions of law, but can as well set aside agency action committed without 
observance of procedures required by law." Silva v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 783, 785 (D. Mass. 
1972), remanded on other grounds, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973), reheard sub nom. Silva v. 
Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (lst Cir. 1973). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). "[Ilt is the court which must construe the statutory mandates ... and having 
construed them, apply them to the particular project and decide whether the agency's failure 
violates the Congressional command." Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882, 888 (W.O. Wis. 
1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). 
<Z See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975) (industrial growth); Hanly v. 
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975) (crime); Tierrasanta Community Council v. Richardson, 
6 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1065 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (socially disruptive influences); Goose Hollow 
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no protection for the urban environment were secondary impacts 
not recognized.43 The ambiguity of the Act itself, however, aggra-
vated by the courts' initial uncertain treatment of secondary im-
pacts,44 has resulted in a failure on the part of the courts to provide 
any clear-cut guidelines for the discussion of secondary impacts in 
an EIS.45 Slowly, certain trends have evolved from this case-by-case 
treatment of secondary impacts.4ft An analysis of the past litigation 
and the developing trends will aid in predicting future court action 
on the issues surrounding secondary impacts in certain fact situa-
tions. 
A. Growth in Population 
1. Where growth is certain 
The secondary impact of population growth has been found to 
constitute a significant impact on the human environment. The 
construction of a housing project, for instance, induces an increase 
in population. Since the impact is determined by the character of 
the area before the action and the resultant degree of change, what 
may be a sigriificant environmental impact in a rural area might not 
be significant in the city or vice-versa.47 A significant growth in 
population at the least strains sewage systems, schools, mass trans-
portation, and community services. Particularly in a rural setting, 
increased population can induce significant construction of roads 
and other facilities, drastically changing the character of the area. 
Population induces physical changes in the environment. The CEQ 
Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971) (character of neighborhood, 
increased population). See also Mid-Shiawassee County Citizens v. Train, 8 ENVT'L REP. 
CASES 1681 (E.D. Mich. 1976) and Dumford v. Ruckelshaus, 5 ENVT'L REP. CASES 1007 (N.D. 
Cal. 1972), where secondary factors were considered. But see Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1462 (1976); IMAGE of 
Greater San Antonio v. Rumsfeld, 9 ENVT'L REP. CASES 1183 (W.D. Tex. 1976) . 
.. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1975). See also First Nat'l Bank of Chicago 
v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973); Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 
1972). 
" Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579, 591 (E.D. Kan. 1974) . 
•• EIS Factors, supra note 19, at 430 . 
.. At least one court has expanded its definition to encompass "all the factors that affect 
the quality of life .... " Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579, 591 (E.D. La. 1974), and one 
administrator has concluded from the courts' interpretation of NEPA that, "'major' means 
'any' and ... 'significant effect' means 'some effect' .... " Joint Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on Public Works and the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 
2d Sess. 415 (1972) (statement of Roger Cromton, Chairman, Administrative Conference of 
the United States). 
" See CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(b) (1976). 
\ 
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advises that overburdening public services must be discussed in an 
EIS because it tends to induce new construction to provide addi-
tional services.48 Courts have readily held population growth to be 
cognizable under NEPA because of its physical, rather than social 
impact. The pertinent cases emphasize the physical impact of popu-
lation growth. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney49 enjoined 
construction of a high-rise apartment building, financed through 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in an 
area which had no high-rise buildings. The court criticized HUD for 
its failure to file an EIS assessing the impact of the concentration 
of population, the resultant change in the character of the neighbor-
hood, and the increased traffic in the area.50 Conversely, in Town of 
Groton v. Laird,51 the court found that the secondary impacts of a 
housing project had been adequately evaluated. 52 There, the Navy 
had considered additional strain on roads, sewage and water facili-
ties53 as well as increased automobile fuel consumption and air pol-
lution in making its decision not to file an EIS.54 
Two cases specifically identify the effects of population growth as 
physical impacts. Fort Story v. Schlesinger55 held that a housing 
project's effects on utilities, highways, schools, and other public 
services are impacts on the physical environment58 and are within 
the zone of interests protected by NEPA.57 In Chelsea Neighborhood 
Associations v. United States Postal Service,58 the court held that 
"possible overcrowding at a local elementary school [and] the need 
for future expansion of local health services,"59 were physical im-
pacts within the meaning of NEPA.80 
In Fort Story and Chelsea Neighborhood Associations, impacts 
which are normally considered socio-economic were labeled physical 
impacts by focusing on their ultimate effect on the physical environ-
ment. Since the courts readily recognize physical impacts, a strat-
.. [d. § 1500.8(3)(ii) . 
.. 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971). 
50 [d. at 879-80. 
" 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972). 
" [d. at 352. 
53 [d. at 348. 
54 [d. at 351. 
55 7 ENVT'L REP. CASES 1141 (E.D. Va. 1974) . 
.. [d. at 1144. 
" [d . 
.. 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975). 
51 [d. at 387 . 
• 0 [d. at 388. 
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egy of emphasizing the physical consequences of secondary impacts 
facilitates a finding of significant impact. 
Where a significant increase in population will result from a pro-
posed action, courts have found that factors such as noise and avail-
ability of parking space deserve discussion in the EIS.81 Implications 
for city growth policies, character of the neighborhood, and neigh-
borhood stability have also been determined as proper subjects for 
consideration in the EIS.62 These factors have both socio-economic 
and physical effects. An activity which will affect both the physical 
environment and man's living environment is generally held cogniz-
able under NEPA. 
2. Factors which might affect the recognition of growth as a 
significant impact 
Growth is a secondary factor accorded great weight by the courts 
and will require the filing of an EIS under varying circumstances. 
A primary impact which in itself is not significant requires the filing 
of an EIS where it induces a significant secondary growth impact.83 
Even induced growth which is speculative may trigger the NEPA 
procedures if it is reasonably foreseeable. 
In City of Davis v. Coleman,84 the court held that although the 
primary impact of the construction of a highway interchange was 
insufficient to require an EIS, the potentially severe secondary im-
pact of induced popUlation growth necessitated compliance with 
NEPA.85 The court found that the interchange was not being built 
to accommodate existing demands, but rather to facilitate a local 
plan for industrial growth which the city predicted would affect the 
•• See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972) (noise); Chelsea Neighborhood 
Ass'ns v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 1975) (availability of parking) . 
.. See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88,93 (2d Cir. 1975) (neighbor-
hood stability); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (implications for 
city growth policies); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 879 (D. 
Ore. 1971) (character of the neighborhood). 
83 In general, some impact on the physical environment must exist in order to trigger the 
NEPA procedures, even though such impact need not be significant. But see Department of 
Defense Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 214.7(b)(2) (1976), which state that secondary impacts 
alone generally are not sufficient to require the filing of an EIS. The Department of the 
Defense has not been a party to a growth case which involved an absence of a significant 
primary impact. The effect of this regulation on a court's determination of such a case is a 
matter of conjecture . 
.. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975) . 
•• [d. at 666. 
I 
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water supply and frustrate the city's controlled growth policy.88 
Emphasizing that "the most serious environmental effects of a pro-
ject may not be obvious, "87 the court stated: 
The growth inducing effects of the Kidwell Interchange project are its 
raison-d'etre, and with growth will come growth of problems: increased 
population, increased traffic, increased pollution, and increased de-
mand for services such as utilities, education, police and fire protection, 
and recreational facilities:88 
The impacts recognized by the court are the same environmental 
consequences that would result from the construction of a housing 
project. Growth will have the same impact on the environment ir-
respective of how it is induced. 
The fact that a primary impact is insufficient to trigger NEPA 
procedures is irrelevant to the issue of whether the secondary impact 
of increased population requires an EIS. A significant secondary 
growth impact alone triggers the NEPA procedures.8u 
"[T]he purpose of an EISIEIR is to evaluate the possibilities in 
light of current and contemplated plans and to produce an informed 
estimate of the environmental consequences. . . . Drafting an 
EISIEIR necessarily involves some degree of forecasting."70 The de-
gree of foreseeability of an increase in population will determine 
whether that increase creates an obligation to file an EIS. In a case 
involving the construction of multi-unit housing, the influx of peo-
ple to fill the units is an expected and very probable result of the 
construction. In such cases, the impact of growth should be dis-
cussed in an EIS. If induced growth will not obviously occur, any 
party challenging an agency decision must show that population is 
likely to increase as a result of the proposed action. Unless antici-
pated growth is foreseeable, it should not require the filing of an 
EIS. The intent of the federal agency involved, the character of the 
area, and the conduct of third parties can all affect the foreseeabil-
ity of anticipated growth.71 
.. [d. at 671. 
" [d. at 673 . 
.. [d. at 675. 
II See id. at 676, n.18. Where the primary impact requires an EIS, the impact of growth 
must be discussed. 
7. [d. at 675. An EIR is an Environmental Impact Report, required by California's version 
of NEPA, The California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-
21151 (West 1970). 
7. Cummington Preservation Comm. v. FAA, 8 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1121 (D. Mass. 1975), 
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Where growth is an intended result of an action, its impact is 
presumably foreseeable and the responsible federal agency should 
be required to predict its consequences. Conversely, where there is 
no intent or plan to induce growth, to expect a federal agency to 
predict what form speculative development would take may be less 
reasonable. In Trout Unlimited v. Morton,72 a suit to enjoin the 
construction of the Teton dam on the grounds that the EIS did not 
discuss the possibility of second home development on the reservoir 
bank was denied, in part, because the induced growth was not an 
intended result.73 In City of Davis v. Coleman,74 however, the court 
found that industrial expansion was the raison-d'etre of the federal 
action and held that the EIS should discuss the effects of growth. 
Two cases brought in the District of Columbia involving attempts 
to enjoin the Comptroller of Currency from approving bank charters 
demonstrate the importance of area characteristics in determining 
the foreseeability of growth. In First National Bank of Homestead 
v. Watson,75 the local bank sought to force the filing of an EIS on 
the grounds that a new bank, with its increased lending activity, 
would induc~ further urbanization in an area already being threat-
ened with a serious ecological crisis.78 The court found that the new 
bank's location in the Miami, Florida area did not significantly 
affect the human environment.77 Given the highly developed and 
industrialized nature of that area, the court found that the bank 
would have no foreseeable effect on the local rate of growth.78 In 
contrast, the same court in Billings v. Camp,78 required the impact 
of growth induced by the chartering of a new bank to be discussed 
in an EIS.80 In Billings, the bank was to be located in Woodstock, 
Vermont, a small, nonindustrial town. The increased development 
occasioned by the introduction of a new bank could have a severe 
impact on the growth rate of the area. 
The predicted conduct of third parties also can contribute to a 
aff'd, 524 F.2d 241 (lst Cir. 1975) articulated a reasonably foreseeable test. 8 ENVT'L REP. 
CASES at 1125. 
7Z 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). 
,. [d. at 1284. 
14 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975). 
7. 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973). 
11 [d. at 469. 
71 [d. at 471. 
10 [d. at 473. 
11 4 ENVT'L REP. CASES 1744 (D.D.C. 1972) . 
.. [d. at 1745. 
I 
140 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:127 
court's finding that growth is not foreseeable. Where local ordi-
nances or disinterested individuals are likely to limit growth, the 
court will find the impact too speculative to be included in an EIS. 
In Cummington Preservation Committee v. FAA,8! the court found 
that since development plans had not received the required town 
approval,82 and since approval was unlikely,83 growth was too specu-
lative to require discussion in an EIS. The court in First National 
Bank of Homestead v. Watson84 also held that no EIS was required 
because growth was outside the control of the new bank.85 The court 
reasoned that the bank would merely fund plans which were devel-
oped by others. 
Homestead demonstrates the possible misapplication of this ra-
tionale to support a finding that growth is not foreseeable. The CEQ 
Guidelines specify the inclusion in an EIS of secondary impacts in 
the form of associated investments which, through inducing new 
facilities and activities, could have a significant impact on the envi-
ronment.88 One of the principal functions of a bank is lending. The 
role of a bank in the development of an area is readily apparent. The 
Comptroller in Homestead could anticipate the form of potential 
growth, despite the necessity of third party conduct. The 
Homestead holding was based in part on the fact that the character 
of the area made a significant growth impact unforeseeable. How-
ever, to the extent that the decision rested on the necessity of third 
party action to produce an increase in population, that decision 
would seem to controvert the NEPA goal of ensuring that environ-
mental concern form an integral part of federal decision making.87 
A federal agency should not avoid its NEPA responsibility by mere 
anticipation of possible conduct of third parties. 
Where substantial questions are raised about the environmental 
consequences of federal action, the responsible agencies should not 
proceed with the proposed action in ignorance of what those conse-
quences will be.88 The reasonably foreseeable test8e should determine 
8. 8 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1121 (D. Mass. 1975), afT'd, 524 F.2d 241 (1st Cir. 1975). 
82 8 ENVT'L REp. CASES at 1125. 
82 The region was considered a "fragile wilderness area." [d. at 1125 n.8. 
8. 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973) . 
.. [d. at 472-73 . 
.. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(3)(ii) (1976). 
87 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) . 
.. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975). 
80 See Cummington Preservation Comm. v. FAA, 8 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1121, 1125 (D. Mass. 
1975), discussed in text Part II(A)(2), supra. 
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when a speculative growth in population deserves discussion in an 
EIS. When the character of an area, the intent of the responsible 
agency, and the possibility of third party interference indicate that 
growth is a reasonably foreseeable result of an agency action, that 
agency must attempt whatever prediction is practicable. Thus, 
speculative impacts can be cognizable under NEPA. 
B. Crime and Socially Disruptive Influences 
The secondary impacts of crime or socially disruptive influences 
have no immediate effect on the physical environment, but do affect 
the general living environment. These non-physical secondary im-
pacts are cognizable under NEPA. Crime has been held to consti-
tute a significant impact on the environment. Although there has 
been some dispute as to the environmental impact of socially dis-
ruptive influences, the trend has been toward recognition of these 
impacts under NEPA. 
Courts have held that a potential increase in crime in an urban 
area is a cognizable impact under NEPA. DO Crime has an impact on 
the general living environment; where personal safety is threatened, 
the neighborhood becomes an unpleasant place to live. Eventually 
property values decline and neighbors vacate the area, affecting the 
stability and character of the neighborhood. Hanly v. Mitchell91 
held that an EIS has to consider the threat of riots, disturbances, 
and danger to safety posed by the construction of a jail in a heavily 
populated, inner-city area. D2 "Noise, traffic, over-burdened mass 
transportation systems, crime, congestion and even availability of 
drugs all affect the urban 'environment' and are surely results of the 
'profound influences of ... high-density urbanization ... .' "83 
Hanly, on rehearing, (hereinafter Hanly II)84 held that the intro-
duction of a drug maintenance center could have a significant 
environmental impact by exposing neighbors and passers-by to drug 
addicts and drug pushers.D5 
to See First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. 
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). 
tI 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972), rehearing sub nom. Hanly 
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), aff'd on 
rehearing, 484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973). 
to 460 F.2d at 646. 
t3 [d. at 647. 
U Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). 
os [d. at 834. 
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The characteristics of the surrounding area can determine if crime 
foreseeably will have a significant effect on the area. First National 
Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 96 while recognizing that crime could 
have a significant impact on the environment, held that since the 
jail in question was to be located in a non-residential, blighted area, 
the impact from crime would not be significant.97 
Some dispute has been centered on the issue of whether com-
munity distaste for having a detention center in the neighborhood 
is a factor which contributes to environmental impact. Distaste can 
lower property values and have effects on a neighborhood similar to 
those created by crime. The court in Hanly IL however, indicated 
that psychological reaction might not be an impact cognizable 
under NEPA: 
It is doubtful whether psychological and sociological effects upon neigh-
bors constitute the type of factors that may be considered in making 
such a determination [of environmental impact] since they do not lend 
themselves to measurement. . . . Unlike factors such as. . . crime, in 
which crime statistics are available, psychological factors are not readily 
translatable into concrete measuring rods. 9s 
The court did not have to decide the question of whether psychologi-
cal distaste was an environmental impact since there was another 
jail in the area. 99 
The Second Circuit's identification of measurability of effect as 
the standard for determining environmental impact has been criti-
cized. Former Chief Justice Friendly, in his dissent in Hanly II,100 
argued that a statute which speaks of "the overall welfare and devel-
opment of man"IOI should not be limited solely to measurable enti-
ties. Citing section 102(2)(B) of the Act, Justice Friendly read the 
congressional mandate that "presently unquantified environmental 
amenities and values . . . be given appropriate consideration in 
decisionmaking ... " as compelling the inclusion of psychological 
and sociological factors in evaluating environmental impacts. 102 Fur-
ther, the concept of measurability is not compatible with the predic-
.. 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973). 
" Id. at 1380 . 
.. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1972) . 
.. Id. 
100 Id. at 836. 
101 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). For a discussion of the wording of the statute, see text Part I(A), 
supra. 
102 471 F.2d at 839. 
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tion required by an EIS: "[I]f the decision turns on accuracy of 
measurement, crime statistics are no better than 'psychological dis-
taste;' their precision comes from the fact they tell us about the past 
rather than what a group will do in the future in a new place."103 
In contrast to Hanly II, Tierrasanta Community Council v. 
Richardson,104 involving a youth detention center in a low-density 
residential area, held that the "psychological and sociological ef-
fects of the proposed youth facility on the families residing in the 
community adjoining the proposed facility, surrounding property 
values, the character of the adjoining residential neighborhoods, 
[and] the education of elementary school children attending a 
school adjacent to the facility," were significant impacts. l05 By re-
quiring an EIS, the court enabled the community to participate in 
the decision to build the center. 108 
The restrictive measurability standard of Hanly II has not been 
followed even in the circuit which established it. The court in 
Chelsea Neighborhood Associations v. United States Postal 
Service,107 enjoining the construction of a multi-story housing pro-
ject on the grounds that the EIS was inadequate, criticized the 
absence of a discussion of the physical and emotional isolation 
caused by living at the top of an 80 foot plateau. lOS 
That an EIS must consider these human factors is well estab-
lished .... We do not know whether informed social scientists would 
conclude that the top of the [project] would likely become a human 
jungle, unsafe at night and unappealing during the day. The question 
must be faced, however, by those who plan the project. IOl 
Without specific reference to the measurability standard, the court 
in Chelsea Neighborhood Associations did not limit environmental 
'03 Daffron, Using NEPA to Exclude the Poor, 4 ENV. AFr. 81, 90 (1975) [hereinafter cited 
as Daffron]. 
'0' 6 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1065 (S.D. Cal. 1973). 
'08 [d. at 1097. Note that, as in the case of population growth, the fact that the primary 
impact is not sufficient to require an EIS does not bar the application of NEPA to secondary 
social impacts. [d. at 1068. 
, .. Although the Hanly II court did not require NEPA procedures, it did allow community 
participation. Since the action would affect the sensibilities of the neighborhood, the court 
required that the responsible federal agency give the public notice and an opportunity to 
submit relevant facts which might bear on the agency's decision to file an EIS. Such an 
alternative would have been unnecessary had the Hanly II court held that psychological and 
sociological factors contributed to environmental impact. See 471 F.2d at 836-37. 
'07 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975). 
'08 [d. at 388. 
'0' [d. 
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impacts to those that are measurable. Whereas statistics might 
exist to demonstrate how unsafe a housing project might be, any 
indication of the emotional isolation caused by living in a project is 
found only in the sociological and psychological disciplines so read-
ily dismissed in Hanly II. 
Statistical measurability should not limit the impacts cognizable 
under NEPA. Where socially disruptive impacts are likely to have 
an effect on the community, those impacts should be discussed in 
the EIS. Crime and the psychological reactions of a community 
affect not only the quality of the living environment, but ultimately 
can result in an impact on the physical environment as well. The 
responsible federal agency should be required to discuss these sec-
ondary impacts in the EIS. 
C. Influx of Minorities 
Assuming that psychological impacts are properly considered 
under NEP A, the extent to which neighborhood fear and distaste 
can be recognized as a secondary impact must be limited. Including 
fear as a factor which determines environmental impact could allow 
NEPA to be used to enforce racial and group prejudices. NEPA has 
been raised in attempts to exclude racial minorities and low income 
groups. Community fear, generated by the introduction of a low 
income housing project foreseeably could affect the environment by 
lowering property values and contributing to neighborhood instabil-
ity. Yet, every allegation that an influx of low income neighbors 
would have an environmental impact has been dismissed by the 
courts. 
In Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners u. Lynn,I1O local residents 
alleged that low income tenants, as a group, possess "a higher pro-
pensity toward criminal behavior and acts of physical violence,. . . 
a disregard for physical and aesthetic maintenance of real and per-
sonal property, ... [and] a lower commitment to hard work."1II 
They argued that such residents would have an adverse impact on 
physical safety, the aesthetics of the neighborhood, and the eco-
nomic quality of life. Citing the inability to predict human behavior 
from economic statistics, and the selection and eviction procedures 
available under the housing plan, the court found that HUn had 
adequately considered the impact of the housing on the neighbor-
110 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1462 (1976). 
III [d. at 228. 
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hood. "To the extent that this claim can be construed to mean that 
HUD must consider the fears of neighbors of prospective public 
housing tenants, we seriously question whether such an impact is 
cognizable under NEPA."1I2 
Similarly, the plaintiffs in Maryland-National Capital Park & 
Planning Commission v. United States Postal Servicell3 alleged that 
the Post Office, in determining that the construction of a bulk mail 
facility did not require an EIS, had failed to recognize that an influx 
of low income workers would be a significant environmental im-
pact.1I4 The court held that the "impact from people pollution on 
'environment,'. . . ." was not cognizable under NEPA.l15 
The cases which have refused to apply NEPA to serve exclusion-
ary ends were decided as much on jurisprudential and underlying 
constitutional grounds as on the basis of environmental injury .118 At 
issue in the exclusionary cases is the impact of people. Determining 
the impact of a group requires prediction of the future behavior of 
individuals. The law cannot accept the proposition that individual 
behavior can be predicted, sociological evidence to the contrary. 
"Sociological evidence based on social class characteristics is un-
suited to the judicial forum on the jurisprudential ground that it 
runs counter to the voluntaristic view of human beings, and the 
ideal of individualized, rule-bound adjudication which characterize 
our tribunals."117 However, requiring a discussion of the impact of 
crime from a new jail also entails the prediction of human behav-
ior. lls Thus, the courts' refusal to use NEPA to impede the construc-
tion of low income housing can not be explained simply as an evi-
dentiary problem. 
Underlying all of the attempts to exclude certain income groups 
under NEPA is the possibility that such exclusionary use of the Act 
violates due process and equal protection. lit Racial groups have tra-
ditionally received special protection under the Constitution. l20 
liZ [d. at 231. 
113 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
"' [d. at 1037. 
115 [d. 
'" See generally Daffron, supra note 103, at 94-110. 
117 [d. at 97. . 
118 Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1975) required an EIS to discuss the impact of 
crime from a new jail. See text Part II(B), supra. 
lit [d. at 101-10 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, "[N]or [shall any person] be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
'20 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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Since the lower income brackets are disproportionately comprised 
of racial minorities, federal action which would serve to exclude low 
income housing may deny the equal protection of the law. 121 Crimi-
nality, rather than being a specially protected classification, affords 
a rational basis for prediction of future behavior which has generally 
been recognized by the judicial system.122 Since criminals as a group 
have not been afforded special constitutional status, resting a fed-
eral decision on a classification of criminality does not raise the 
constitutional problems inherent in a racial classification. 
Several solutions are available to the courts for avoiding the use 
of NEP A for exclusionary purposes. The standard of measurability 
proposed in Hanly II\23 was used by the Second Circuit to avoid 
serving exclusionary ends through NEPA. "Implicit in the court's 
rejection of sociological effects . . . may have been the unspoken 
convictions that the plaintiffs were objecting to the economic and 
social status of the new jail's inmates and visitors."124 In Trinity 
Episcopal Church v. Romney, 125 the Second Circuit refined the mea-
surability standard by holding that where a finding of an environ-
mental impact might interefere with housing for racial and eco-
nomic groups, the analysis of the environmental impact must rest 
on objective and measurable criteria. "Accordingly, neither the al-
leged anti-social propensities of low income persons nor the fears 
which their increasing presence may engender are objective criteria 
of community stability and as such do not fall within the ambit of 
a NEPA study."128 
The measurability standard, however, runs counter to the objec-
tive of prediction inherent in the EIS procedure,127 and a preferable 
basis for denying exclusionary claims should be found. A finding of 
impermissible motives underlying the suit, as yet implicit in this 
area of litigation, should be the explicit basis for denying exclusion-
ary claims. The courts do not hesitate to look behind the pleadings 
to determine motives in other types of NEPA litigation.128 Further-
more, the Supreme Court recently held that racially discriminatory 
.2. See, e.g., Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. 
Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971) . 
• 22 See Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937) . 
• 23 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) . 
• 24 EIS's and Hanly, supra note 6, at 544 . 
• 25 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975). 
". 387 F. Supp. at 1037 . 
• 21 See text Part II(B), supra . 
• " See text Part II(D)(l), infra. 
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intent should determine equal protection violations in housing. 129 
Where the underlying motive of a suit is to exclude racial and eco-
nomic classifications, concerns based on the anticipated behavior of 
groups should not be recognized as valid claims under NEPA. 
A discussion of minorities and income groups does have a place 
in an EIS. Where an initial concern with race or income factors 
provides the impetus for raising legitimate environmental impacts, 
such factors are cognizable under NEPA.I30 For example, in Jones 
v. HUD,131 a proposed action which would result in a change of 
income characteristics in an area was held to be a significant impact 
on the environment. The change in land use and possible traffic 
congestion were found to be impacts which required the filing of an 
EIS.132 In Prince George's County v. HollowaY,133 the relocation of a 
Naval base posed serious problems concerning the availability of 
adequate housing for low and middle income groups and racial mi-
norities. l34 The court found that this impact should have been dis-
cussed.135 The courts in these cases were not concerned with behav-
ior of low income groups or racial minorities, but rather focused on 
the physical impact caused, in one case, by altering the character 
of the neighborhood, and, in the other, by overburdening existing 
housing facilities. In such a context, where no exclusionary motive 
exists, an initial consideration of income characteristics is entirely 
proper. 
D. Economic Interests 
1. Business Motives 
Economic injury is not a secondary impact which is cognizable 
under NEPA.138 Where a plaintiff will be injured environmentally as 
121 Villa.ge of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), where racially discriminatory intent was 
required to show violation of equal protection in an employment setting. 
130 Maryland Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 
F.2d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
131 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974). 
132 [d. at 592. 
133 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd; 527 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
134 404 F. Supp. at 1187. 
136 [d. at 1186. 
"" See Clinton Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Medical Center, 374 F. Supp. 450 
(D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 1048 (1975); Pizitz, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 2 E.L.R. 20378 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Zlotnick v. Redevelopment Land Agency, 2 
E.L.R. 20235 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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well as economically, he can raise only the environmental issues 
under NEPA. A plaintiff alleging solely economic injury has no 
standing to challenge the agency action. Such a plaintiff has an 
injury in fact, but does not have an injury within the zone of inter-
ests protected by NEP A, 137 for NEP A protects only environmental 
interests. 
The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit 
in Zlotnick v. Redevelopment Land Agency. 138 Owners of nonresi-
dential property which was to be acquired by the city under a redev-
elopment plan argued that if a more thorough EIS were filed, the 
city might decide on a different redevelopment plan, thereby allow-
ing them to develop their property in a commercially profitable 
manner. These allegations were insufficient under NEPA. The 
courts will examine the underlying motives of the plaintiffs to deter-
mine if they are economic. In Pizitz, Inc. v. Volpe, 131 the court found 
the EIS sufficient and characterized the suit as "'spurious' because, 
as the pleadings reflect, plaintiffs' primary concern in filing and 
prosecuting this litigation was to avert a threatened loss of busi-
ness .... Of course, the National Environmental Policy Act was 
not designed to prevent loss of profits."14o 
In certain cases, economic and environmental injuries can be 
closely interrelated. A plaintiff alleging economic injury also can 
have cognizable environmental injury. In such a case, the court will 
examine the environmental issues. Plaintiffs in Cummington Pres-
ervation Committee v. FAA 141 alleged injury to the operation of a 
dairy farm. The court held that these interests were economic and 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their economic inju-
137 Standing determines who is the proper plaintiff to achieve the degree of adversity neces-
sary to bring suit. For a discussion of standing, see Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: 
Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255 (1961). Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), 
established a two-fold test for standing: plaintiff must allege an injury in fact and the injury 
must be arguably within the zone of interests protected by NEPA. The Supreme Court 
specifically declined to decide whether standing can be maintained through an alleged eco-
nomic injury under NEPA. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 n.13 (1973). See 
also City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); IMAGE of Greater San Antonio 
v. Rumsfeld, 9 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1183 (W.O. Tex. 1976); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. 
Supp. 221 (W.O. Mo. 1975); Clinton Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Medical 
Center, 374 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
442 U.S. 1048 (1975). 
138 2 E.L.R. 20235, 20236 (D.D.C. 1972). 
131 2 E.L.R. 20378 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972). 
1 .. 2 E.L.R. at 20378. 
1'1 8 ENVT'L REP. CASES 1121 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 524 F.2d 241 (1st Cir. 1975). 
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ries. 142 However, the Court recognized that an injury to the profits 
of a dairy farm resulting from damage to cows implies an environ-
mental injury. The court deemed the pleadings amended to allege 
environmental injuries l43 and decided the case on the merits. 144 
Notwithstanding the relationship between environmental and 
economic injury, a plaintiff who has only a financial interest cannot 
achieve standing under NEPA simply by fashioning an environmen-
tal injury for the purpose of the pleadings. In Clinton Community 
Hospital Corp. u. Southern Maryland Medical Center,145 the injury 
alleged by the plaintiff hospital was its predicted forced closing 
caused by the construction of a newer, larger hospital. Plaintiff's 
real aim was "to prevent the building of a competitive hospital by 
highlighting the disadvantages of the competitor's site near an ex-
isting air base. While showing a real injury, this status is not within 
the area protected or regulated by NEPA."148 Again, plaintiffs were 
found to lack standing. 147 
The underlying economic interests of the plaintiff may affect the 
weight given to environmental claims. In First National Bank of 
Homestead u. Watson,148 one factor in the court's determination 
that the alleged impact of growth was not significant may have been 
the nature of the plaintiff raising the environmental issue. Plaintiff 
Bank, the only banking association in Homestead,149 brought suit 
individually and on behalf of directors, officers, and shareholders, 
as citizens. Although the plaintiffs raised sufficient environmental 
issues to maintain standing, the suit appeared to be an attempt to 
control commercial competition. Further, the court found "some 
indication in the record that plaintiffs would not object to the estab-
lishment of an independent bank unsupported by the resources of a 
bank holding company and presumably with fewer assets."150 Al-
though not expressly stated, the court might not have fully consid-
ered the environmental issues because of the extent of the plaintiffs' 
,42 8 ENVT'L REp. CASES at 1123. 
". [d. at 1124. 
". The court found that the EIS filed was adequate. [d. at 1125. For a discussion of this 
case in the context of growth as a secondary factor, see text Part Il(A)(2), supra. 
". 374 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974), aft'd, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 
U.S. 1048 (1975). 
,,, 374 F. Supp. at 455. 
'" 8 ENVT'L REp. CASES at 1123. 
". 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973). 
'"~ [d. at 468. 
,50 [d. at 496 n.4. 
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underlying business motive.151 
Where a plaintiff arguably has a business interest to protect, the 
court should examine carefully any allegation of environmental in-
jury. Preservation of a profitable business is not a factor which 
determines the environmental impact of an action. Although certain 
environmental injuries will result in economic injuries, those alleg-
ing business injury only cannot raise NEPA issues. Business injury, 
although an injury in fact, is not within the zone of interests pro-
tected by NEPA, and will not confer standing. 
2. The Military Lay-Off Cases 
Several cases raise the issue of whether a transfer of a military 
base which results in the lay-off of civilian employees is an action 
which significantly affects the human environment under NEPA. 
The effects of a base transfer on the area in which the base will be 
relocated are significant impacts on the human environment. 152 The 
lay-off cases concern the environmental impact on the area vacated 
by a transfer. 
The immediate physical impact on the environment is negligible 
or even beneficial. I53 The transfer of a military facility can eliminate 
air and noise pollution in the area. The lay-off of civilian employees, 
however, increases the local rate of unemployment which can lead 
to a high incidence of mortgage default and the disruption of the 
family unit as the wage-earner leaves the area to find work. 154 Both 
of these factors affect the stability of a neighborhood, possibly re-
sulting in its deterioration. Thus, a major lay-off not only affects the 
living environment, but also can have serious consequences for the 
physical environment. 
Despite the serious environmental harm posed by the transfer of 
a military base, only one case has held that such an action requires 
the filing of an EIS. In McDowell v. Schlesinger, 155 civilian employ-
ees and a Missouri county brought suit to enjoin the Department of 
'" For a discussion of this case in the context of growth as a secondary factor, see text Part 
II(A)(2), supra . 
... See Prince George's County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181, 1186 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 
527 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
,03 For a discussion of the beneficial impact on the environment of a military transfer, see 
National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 8 ENVT'L REP. CASES 2153 (D.D.C. 1976). 
'54 See IMAGE of Greater San Antonio v. Rumsfeld, 9 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1183, 1185 (W.D. 
Tex. 1976). 
". 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975). 
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Defense from proceeding with a planned transfer of an Air Force 
unit. The court held that the secondary impact of the resulting 
unemployment, even in the absence of a primary impact, was suffi-
cient to require the filing of an EIS. 
[P]laintiffs have shown that the proposed transfer ... of approxi-
mately 7,500 persons [away from the area] could and will result in 
significant impacts to the . . . area on, among other things, existing 
social and economic activities and conditions in the area: problems 
relating to law enforcement and fire prevention, growth and develop-
ment patterns in the area, including existing land use patterns, and 
neighborhood character and cohesiveness, etc ..... While most of 
these potential impacts may properly be termed 'secondary' impacts, 
... [w]here such impacts may be significant, ... NEPA applies to 
the proposed action, including its requirement of the preparation of a 
detailed EIS by the defendant agencies. 156 
Other courts which have considered a military lay-off have denied 
that the resultant secondary impacts were cognizable under NEPA. 
These courts hold that secondary impacts do not require the filing 
of an EIS in the absence of a primary impact and that economic 
injuries, even though they result in environmental injuries, are not 
cognizable under NEPA. National Association of Government Em-
ployees v. Rumsfeldl57 and Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 158 both involv-
ing the elimination of civilian jobs, held that secondary impacts 
standing alone are not cognizable under the Act. Other circuits, 
however, have found that secondary impacts, in the absence of a 
significant primary impact, are cognizable under NEPA.159 In 
IMAGE of Greater San Antonio v. Rumsfeld,180 despite extensive 
evidence of the impact on the living and physical environments, the 
court held that these secondary impacts were insufficient to trigger 
the NEPA procedures. "All of the cases that are concerned with the 
socio-economic impacts are also concerned with increased demands 
on our life support systems. They address the impact of an influx 
of people upon limited natural resources."I81 The court's reasoning 
... [d. at 254. 
m 8 ENVT'L REp. CASES 2153 (D.D.C. 1976). This case relied on the Defense Regulations 
which state that secondary impacts alone are insufficient to require an EIS. 32 C.F.R. § 
214.7(7)(b)(2) (1976). See text Part II(A)(2), supra. 
'58 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976). 
IS' See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); Tierrasanta Community 
Council v. Richardson, 6 ENVT'L REP. CASES 1065 (S.D. Cal. 1973). 
10. 9 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1183 (W.D. Tex. 1976). 
10' [d. at 1187. 
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here is questionable, since the secondary injuries alleged by the 
IMAGE plaintiffs have a physical impact on the living environment 
and are of the type which have been readily accepted as significant 
impacts. 
The courts in IMAGE, Breckinridge, and Government Employees 
equated recognizing the environmental impact of )lnemployment 
with giving standing to an economic injury. 
We hold that the district court was in error in undertaking to transform 
NEPA from a law designed to protect and enhance the natural resources 
of the nation into a statute prohibiting the discharge and transfer of 
personnel at an army installation. . . . [I]t was not the intention of 
Congress for NEPA to be used for purposes of promoting full employ-
ment or to prevent the discharge or transfer of federal personnel. I82 
The courts are correct in their interpretation that NEPA does not 
define an economic policy, but these cases do not concern purely a 
financial interest in preventing lost profits. 183 Rather, these are cases 
where a primarily economic action could result in a significant envi-
ronmental impact. If environmental injury which causes economic 
injury is cognizable under NEPA,184 economic action which would 
cause environmental injury also should be recognized under the Act. 
A refusal to consider the environmental impact of an action merely 
because the action is economic in nature controverts the policy of 
NEPA.185 
The nature of the proposed agency action should be irrelevant;188 
significant impact should be the sole standard for the filing of an 
EIS. "The central focus should not be on a primary/secondary im-
pact analysis, but upon those impacts (either primary or secondary) 
which have a 'significant impact' upon the environment. "187 Since 
a lay-off of a substantial number of workers would have an impact 
on the human environment, such an action should require the filing 
of an EIS. 
"' Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864,865 (6th Cir. 1976). 
113 See Zlotnick v. Redevelopment Land Agency, 2 E.L.R. 20235 (D.D.C. 1972). 
II. See text Part 11(0)(1), supra. 
,.5 IMAGE of Greater San Antonio v. Rumsfeld, 9 Envt'l Rep. Cases 1183, 1185 (W.O. Tex. 
1976) demonstrates how well·documented such injury can be. 
"' City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975). 
117 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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CONCLUSION 
Several sections of NEPA,188 the legislative history of the Act, 189 
and various regulations promulgated under NEPAI70 all dictate the 
inclusion of secondary impacts under the Act. In general, if the 
secondary impact significantly affects the environment, it requires 
the filing of an EIS irrespective of whether the primary impact alone 
is significant. The role of secondary impacts under NEPA has been 
uncertain in the courts, but the recognition of secondary factors is 
essential to its goal of assuring "for all Americans safe, healthful, 
productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surround-
ings."171 
Although the liberal inclusion of secondary impacts under NEPA 
has been criticized for detracting from the goal of long term resource 
protection,172 the recognition of secondary impacts has ensured the 
vitality of the Act by focusing attention on the more subtle problems 
of man's living environment.173 The goal of protecting natural re-
sources and the goal of promoting man's living environment are not 
mutually exclusive. Even where secondary environmental impact is 
questionable, NEPA goals would be better served by requiring the 
filing of an EIS. The EIS procedure merely allows community input 
and ensures that environmental factors contribute to the agency 
decision. 
NEPA does and should protect a broad range of factors which 
affect the quality of the human environment. In order to continue 
as effective legislation, NEPA must be construed to recognize fully 
the wide variety of impacts on the human environment. An action 
should be subject to an EIS procedure where plaintiffs genuinely 
II. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331, 4332 (1970). For a discussion of the legislative history of 
NEPA, see text Part I(A), supra. 
III See 115 CONGo REe. 40417 (1969); S. REp. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 2751, 2761-66 
(1969). 
178 See CEQ GUIDELINES, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500 et seq. (1976); Department of Defense Regula-
tions, 32 C.F.R. § 214.7 (1976); Department of Housing and Urban Development Regulations, 
24 C.F.R. §§ 58.27 et seq. (1976); Treasury Department Regulations, 36 Fed. Reg. § 14221 
(1971). 
171 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (1970). 
172 See IMAGE of Greater San Antonio V. Rumsfeld, 9 ENVT'L REP. CASES 1183, 1187 (W.D. 
Tex. 1976). 
173 "NEPA and the controversy that has grown up around it have served to focus the 
attention of the government, private industry, and the public on some fundamental issues 
that have long cried out for attention." Joint Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Public Works 
and the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (statement of 
Sen. Baker). 
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allege a foreseeable environmental injury, regardless of whether the 
form of injury is deterioration of neighborhoods, a higher incidence 
of crime, or overburdened public facilities. NEPA should not be 
used to promote concerns which are not environmental, such as 
business profits or racial prejudices. Significant environmental im-
pact, whatever its form, is the only factor relevant to the application 
ofNEPA. 
